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Abstract 
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of 
punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, 
however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a common good 
which can be exploited. Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on 
those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called pool punishment. In this 
scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engaging in the joint enterprise, and without knowing 
who the free-riders will be. Theoretical investigations (Sigmund et al. 2010) have shown that peer punishment is 
more efficient, but pool punishment more stable. Social learning, i.e., the preferential imitation of successful 
strategies, should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed on second-order free-riders, but to peer 
punishment if they are not. Here we describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this 
prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer 
punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a 
spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free rider problem.   
Keywords 
Public goods, experiments, collective action, punishment, institution, social learning.  
JEL codes 
C73, C91, D03 
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1. Introduction 
The role of punishment in boosting cooperation is a well-studied topic in experimental 
economics. However, most investigations deal with so-called peer-punishment (see, e.g., Fehr 
and Gächter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fowler 2005; Henrich et al. 2006; 
Casari 2007; Sigmund 2007; Carpenter 2007; Egas and Riedl 2008; Gächter et al. 2008; 
Chaudhuri 2011). Typically, the players in a public good game are allowed to impose fines on 
others, at a cost to themselves. The threat of punishment can lead to considerable increases in 
the level of cooperation in the collective action. Many players are willing (and frequently 
even eager) to shoulder the costs of imposing fines on cheaters. Some subjects, however, 
abuse sanctioning opportunities by engaging in antisocial punishment which harms 
cooperators (Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Dreber et al. 2008; 
Hermann et al. 2008; Nikiforakis 2008). 
In most aspects of everyday life, the task of punishing exploiters has eventually been 
taken over by institutions (Ostrom 2005; Guala 2012). In developed societies, 
peer-punishment is not only less common (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis 2012), but often 
explicitly forbidden. Under conditions of anarchy (e.g., Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’), 
individuals have to take punishment into their own hands, but in all better-regulated 
communities, individuals engage in some form of social contract by delegating punishment to 
institutions. How can we envisage this important step in social development?  
Evidently, this question can be approached from many different angles. We use an 
economic experiment to test how individuals who want to coerce their group to cooperate 
decide between inflicting pro-social punishment directly or using the intermediary of an 
institution. We do not offer them opportunities for antisocial punishment, or the bribery of 
institutions, but rather concentrate on the idealized versions. The foremost problem, in such 
an experiment, is how to implement the sanctioning institution (Tyler and Degoey 1995; 
Casari and Luini 2009; Kosfeld et al. 2009; Andreoni and Gee 2012). Which is the essential 
feature distinguishing institutional from peer-punishment? Some argue that it is the delegation 
of punishment. However, individuals who want to exert personal revenge can recur to ‘hiring 
a gun’, and this would still count as peer-punishment (Van Vugt et al. 2009). A more 
pronounced difference is that sanctioning institutions are established in advance, and thus 
entail running costs even in the case that no one commits a punishable offense. A county 
would have to pay its sheriff even if nobody commits a crime. We tried to model this as 
‘pool-punishment’ (for experimental papers, see Yamagishi 1986; Guillen et al. 2006; Kamei 
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et al. 2011; Markussen et al. 2011; Traulsen et al. 2012; for theory, see Sigmund et al. 2010, 
2011). Players who want to use such a sanctioning tool have to pay a fee, even before the joint 
enterprise takes place, or at least before they are informed of its outcome, and thus before they 
know whether there will be any exploiters to punish. Pool punishers can be viewed as paying 
a tax towards a police. We note that instead of pool- or peer-punishment, some authors use the 
terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sanctions (Kamei et al. 2011; Markussen et al. 2011). 
In our experiment, we investigated 18 small groups, or ‘toy-communities’, of 12 to 14 
players. Each such group played 50 rounds of a Mutual Aid game, isolated from the other 
groups. The Mutual Aid Game is a variant of a Public Goods game, where players do not 
obtain any return from their own contribution, and hence are faced with an even more 
pronounced social dilemma. Within each group, players could decide, before each round, 
whether to join a Mutual Aid game without punishment (NoPun), with peer-punishment 
(Peer), with pool-punishment (Pool) or not to participate in the game at all (No). These games 
were played separately, i.e., the outcome of one game did not affect the outcomes of the other 
games in the group. Players were anonymous, and prevented from communicating. All that 
players learned, after each round, was how many opted, in their group, for each alternative, 
and which payoff they obtained. They then could choose whether to opt for (NoPun), (Peer), 
(Pool) or (No) in the next round. We thus observed, in each toy community, whether social 
learning led to institutional punishment or not. 
It is clear that if pro-social punishment works as desired, i.e., if it leads to all-out 
cooperation, then peer- punishment is more efficient than pool-punishment, since it entails no 
running costs. However, theoretical considerations (Sigmund et al. 2010, see relevant theory 
in section 2) imply that pool-punishment is more stable, provided that it is also directed at 
those participants in the game who do not contribute to the punishment pool. Indeed, if 
cooperation is achieved, i.e., if no one needs to be punished, then a peer-punisher cannot be 
distinguished from a non-punisher. This means that second-order free-riders (defined as those 
who contribute to the Mutual Aid, but not to the sanctions) cannot be spotted, and thus cannot 
be punished. By contrast, those who do not contribute to the punishment pool are just as 
visible as those who do not contribute to the Mutual Aid, and can be punished just as well. A 
system implementing this is highly immune against exploitation, but requires payment of 
some sort of a tax to maintain the punishment pool. We wanted to compare the attractiveness 
of first-order and second-order pool punishment against the background of the same peer 
punishment and no punishment alternatives. 
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In our experiment, a clear majority chose peer punishment in the first round. Most 
players switched to pool punishment in later rounds, but (as predicted by theory) only if 
punishment was also imposed on second-order free-riders. The experiment involved 238 
first-year students from universities in Vienna. Interactions were anonymous. Players were 
randomly allocated to 18 groups of 12 to 14 players each, for the duration of 50 rounds. We 
implemented 2 treatments with 9 groups each: in the ‘second-order treatment’, players were 
offered a pool punishment game which sanctioned second-order free riders, and in the 
‘first-order treatment’ a pool punishment game which did not. The former treatment led to the 
emergence of pool punishment in six out of the nine groups, the latter in none. Peer 
punishment slowly declined over rounds in both treatments. Roughly speaking, it was not 
displaced by pool punishment, but eroded gradually. Contributions to the Mutual Aid game 
were vastly more frequent in the treatment with second-order pool punishment.  
In a nutshell, players were allowed to ‘vote with their feet’ (the expression seems to be 
due to Tiebout 1956), and most of them decided in favor of a sanctioning institution, but only 
if this institution coerced participants to contribute not merely to the Mutual Aid, but also to 
its own upkeep. Under this additional commitment, the institution was adopted by the group, 
in a kind of ‘social contract’ which was achieved without explicit communication or 
deliberation, and was based on social learning from the own experience and that of others.  
In section 2, we describe the theoretical background, and in section 3, the experiment. In 
section 4, we display the results, and in section 5, we offer a discussion and conclusions. The 
instructions for the players and the detailed results of every group are contained in the 
supplementary information of the Online Resource. 
 
2. Theoretical background: a choice of games 
In this section, we introduce the types of games used in the experiment and briefly sketch 
some of the relevant theory from Sigmund et al. (2010). 
First of all, let us consider the Mutual Aid game (MA game) of type (NoPun) (no 
punishment). There are m players in the group. They can decide whether or not to contribute 
an amount c>0, knowing that this will be multiplied by r>1 and divided among all other 
players in the group. If mC is the number of those players who contribute, and mD the number 
of those who don’t (with mC+mD =m), then the payoff for a contributor is 
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1
1
C CmP rc c
m
   
and that for a defector 
1
D CmP rc
m
  . 
Clearly, we always have P
D
>P
C
 (the difference is independent of mC) and thus the dominant 
strategy is to refuse to contribute. If all players contribute, their payoff is (r-1)c, which is 
independent of group size m. In our experiment, c=1 monetary unit (MU), r=3 and m≥2 is 
variable. This game was first described in Wilson (1975), see also Sugden (1986), Yamagishi 
(1986), Fletcher and Zwick (2004), Sigmund (2010). It is very similar to the usual public 
good game (PG game), see e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000). Whereas in the latter, an amount r/m 
of a player’s contribution returns to the player, in the MA game players do not obtain any 
return from their own contribution. In Sigmund et al. 2010, 2011, the Mutual Aid game has 
been called the ‘others only’ variant of the Public Goods game. In our setup, the number of 
participants m can fluctuate. If m is smaller than r, the PG game is no longer a social 
dilemma: to contribute is the dominant strategy. Most PG games do explore the case when 
m<r, but we wanted to make it more difficult for cooperation to emerge: for the MA game, 
defection is always the dominant strategy. Note that if everyone contributes, the payoff is the 
same, namely ( 1)r c , in both the MA and the PG game. 
Now let us consider the MA game of type (Peer) (peer punishment). After deciding 
whether to contribute or not to the Mutual Aid in an MA game, players can punish defectors. 
We assume that only players who contribute can punish. If they do, they have to punish all 
defectors in the group. As the focus of our study is the decision between different types of 
pro-social punishment, this assumption makes the issue as clear-cut as possible. 
Let us suppose that mPe is the number of players who contribute and punish those who do 
not contribute, mC is the number of players who contribute, but do not punish, and mD is the 
number of those who neither contribute nor punish, i.e., the defectors or free-riders. Thus 
mPe+mC+mD=m. Every peer punisher has to punish every free rider. Let ȕ be the size of the 
fine that each non-contributor has to pay per punisher, and Ȗ the fee each punisher has to pay 
for each non-contributor he or she punishes. The cost of punishment is uncertain as it depends 
on the number mD of free-riders, but the fine-to-fee ratio is fixed to ȕ: Ȗ. Then we obtain as 
payoff values 
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1
1
1
1
1
C C Pe
Pe C Pe
D
D C Pe
Pe
m m
P rc c
m
m m
P rc c m
m
m m
P rc m
m


      
 
There is no dominant strategy. The group optimum is obtained whenever mD =0. In this case, 
every player obtains (r-1)c, just as in the MA game of type (NoPun). Clearly, we have P
C≥PPe 
(with equality if and only if mD =0). The state when no one contributes is a strict Nash 
equilibrium. Other (non-strict) equilibria exist for mD =0 and mPe≥(c+ȕ)/ȕ. In our experiment, 
ȕ=1 MU and Ȗ=0.5 MU so that states with two or more peer punishers, but no defector are 
also Nash equilibria. 
Finally, let us consider the MA game of type (Pool) (pool punishment).  Just as in the 
(Peer) game, we assume that only contributors can punish. At the same time that they decide 
whether to contribute to the Mutaual Aid or not, they also decide whether to contribute to the 
punishment pool. There are mC players who contribute to the Mutual Aid, but not to the 
punishment pool, mPo players who contribute to both pools, and mD players who contribute to 
neither pool (with mPo+mC+mD=m). Pool punishers have to contribute an amount c to the 
Mutual Aid and an amount F to the punishment pool. The fine-to-fee ratio depends on the 
number of free-riders.  
The (Pool) game is played in two variants. In the first-order variant, everyone who does 
not contribute to the Mutual Aid is fined by an amount BmPo, whereas in the second-order 
variant, everyone who does not contribute to the punishment pool (i.e., who does not 
contribute to both Mutual Aid and the sanctioning) is fined by that amount. The payoff values 
are 
1
1
Po C Pom mP rc c F
m
     
and in the first-order variant (Pool1) 
1
1
1
C C Po
D C Po
Po
m m
P rc c
m
m m
P rc Bm
m
   
 
resp. in the second-order variant (Pool2) 
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1
1
1
C C Po
Po
D C Po
Po
m m
P rc c Bm
m
m m
P rc Bm
m
    
 
In our experiment, we used B=1 MU and F=0.5 MU. In the first-order variant, we have  
P
C
>P
Po
 so that mD =m is the only Nash equilibrium. In the second-order variant, mPo =m is 
another equilibrium (as long as c+F≤B(m-1), which for our parameter values means that there 
are at least three punishers). This equilibrium is not efficient (i.e., pareto-optimal), since mC 
=m provides a higher per capita payoff and actually is the group optimum. 
In each of these games, the all-defector state is a strict Nash equilibrium. In the context 
of evolutionary games, it represents a social trap. How, then, could cooperation emerge? In 
Sigmund et al. 2010, it was shown that if the game is optional, i.e., if players have also the 
possibility of abstaining from it, then cooperation based on peer- or pool punishment can 
emerge. Indeed, the participation in a Mutual Aid game (or a public good game) can be 
viewed as a risky enterprise, which only succeeds if enough co-players cooperate. 
Non-participants can be viewed as risk-averse players who, rather than engage in such an 
uncertain interaction, prefer to engage in some other activity whose payoff  does not 
depend on what the others are doing. We assume that this payoff is somewhere between the 
payoff obtained if no one contributes to the MA game, and that obtained if everyone 
contributes to the common pool (and, in the Pool game, to the punishment pool). This means 
cr )1(0  and, in the Pool game, .)1(0 Fcr   Whenever defectors thrive and 
cooperation breaks down, the option of abstaining from the game yields a higher payoff and 
non-participants take over.  This in turn gives players willing to invest in the Mutual Aid 
game the chance to re-establish cooperation. The possibility of abstaining from the game 
therefore offers an escape from the social trap. In the theoretical model of Sigmund et al. 
2010, free riders took over if participation was not optional, but compulsory. 
For the competition between peer-punishment and pool-punishment, Sigmund et al 
(2010, 2011) show, using arguments from evolutionary game theory, that in the first-order 
variant, peer-punishers prevail most of the time, but sometimes second-order free-riders 
invade. In this case, defectors and then non-participants take over before peer-punishment is 
reestablished. In contrast, in the second-order version, pool-punishers eventually establish a 
very stable regime, although it is less efficient. 
 
- 8 - 
3. The experiment 
The 18 groups of 12 to 14 players (our ‘toy-communities’) were the independent sample 
points of our experiment. Players in different groups were not allowed to communicate with 
each other and interacted only within their group. The players were not told that the number 
of rounds was fixed beforehand at 50, so as to prevent end-round effects. In each round, 
players were given 3 MU and asked to choose one of three variants of the Mutual Aid (MA) 
games: (NoPun) MA without punishment; (Peer) MA with peer punishment; (Pool) MA with 
pool punishment. The players could also decide (No) not to participate in any of these games. 
Such non-participants received an additional 0.5 MU. The idea, here, was that when not 
participating in a joint enterprise, an individual can engage in some useful activity which does 
not depend on the decisions of others.  
Once players had chosen one of these games, they played one round of the game they had 
chosen with those group-members who had chosen the same game. Players who opted for one 
of the games (NoPun), (Peer) or (Pool), but found no co-players to join them, were treated as 
non-participants (No), and received an additional 0.5 MU, independently of what the others 
did. Once the round was over, the players learned how many (in their group) had played 
(NoPun), (Peer), (Pool) or (No), how many in each game had chosen which strategy, and 
which payoff they had obtained. They could use this information to decide for which game to 
opt in the next round. Players did not learn about who did what, so there was no possibility to 
establish a reputation. Players knew that they would be paid immediately after the experiment, 
at a rate of 10 cents (euro) per MU, without having to give away their identity (as players) to 
their co-players or to the experimenters. The guaranteed minimal payoff was 10 euro.  
Players participating in a MA game of type (NoPun) could decide whether or not to 
contribute 1 MU to the common pool, knowing that their contribution would be multiplied by 
3 and divided equally among all other players in their game, irrespective of whether these 
co-players had contributed or not. Thus contributors did not benefit from their own 
contribution. If all cooperate, everyone gains 2 MU. 
Players choosing to participate in an MA game of type (Peer) would first play an MA 
game as described above, and then, in a second stage of the same round, be shown the number 
of non-contributors (i.e., defectors) in their game. Contributors could then decide whether or 
not to punish these free-riders. The fine-to-fee ratio is fixed to 2:1 in (Peer), as used in 
Carpenter (2007) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008). Each punisher would have to pay a 
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fee of 0.5 MU per defector, and each defector would have to pay a fine of 1 MU per punisher. 
Again, if all cooperate, everyone gains 2 MU.  
Players participating in a MA game of type (Pool) had to choose between three options: 
(i) not to contribute anything, (ii) to contribute to the Mutual Aid (i.e., to pay 1 MU so that 3 
MU would be shared among all other members who had chosen (Pool)), or (iii) to contribute 
to both the Mutual Aid and the punishment pool. This last alternative requires the players to 
pay 1 MU to the Mutual Aid and an additional 0.5 MU into the punishment pool. Thus if all 
cooperate, everyone gains 1.5 MU. This MA game was played in two variants, denoted as 
‘first-order variant’ resp. ‘second-order variant’. In the first-order variant, players knew that 
everyone who had not contributed to the Mutual Aid would be fined 1MU per punisher. In the 
second-order variant, players knew that everyone who had not contributed to both Mutual Aid 
and punishment pool would be fined 1MU per punisher. Hence, in the second-order variant of 
game (Pool), the institution punishes all of these free-riders (i.e., those who opted for (i) or 
(ii)) irrespective of whether they contributed or not to the Mutual Aid game), while in the 
first-order variant (Pool1), second-order free-riders (those who opted for (ii)) were not 
punished. The fine to fee ratio can greatly vary, in this game, depending on the number of 
defectors and pool punishers. In groups 1-9 (with altogether 120 subjects), the game of type 
(Pool) was offered in the first-order variant, and in groups 10-18 (with 118 subjects) in the 
second-order variant.  
We note that this is a complex game, without obvious money-maximizing strategies for 
the individuals choosing (Peer) and (Pool), since payoff depends on how many decide for the 
different options. In order to provide the players with an appreciation of the issues involved, 
they were given, at the start of the session, 25 practice rounds (see Online Resource). They 
knew that these rounds would not count towards their score and that groups would be 
reshuffled before the experiment started. More precisely, players were first given, via 
computer screen, a brief introduction into game (NoPun), then played five rounds of the game 
(NoPun). The same then happened with games (Peer) and (Pool). Finally, they all played 10 
rounds with the option, in each round, to choose between the three games (NoPun), (Peer) 
(Pool), or (No), which meant to abstain from participation (exactly as later in the actual 
experiment). Thus players could familiarize themselves with their options, in the practice 
rounds, but were precluded from sharing their experiences through communication. 
Immediately after the practice rounds, the ‘toy communities’ were re-assembled randomly.  
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After each round, players were shown the payoffs for all strategies used in their group, 
and had 15 seconds to decide which game (NoPun), (Peer), (Pool) or (No) to join next. The 
tightness of the schedule and the complexity of the task provided a strong motivation to be 
guided by the size of the payoffs, i.e., to engage in social learning. We also did used loaded 
language in the instructions, for instance by calling punishment ‘punishment’. Since our main 
aim was to compare different pro-social sanctioning mechanisms, we felt justified in 
acknowledging the underlying, common intention to uphold norms of collaboration. In the 
same spirit, asocial punishment or revenge were not offered as options to our players. 
Moreover, to reduce the complexity, we avoided the issue of increasing or decreasing group 
returns (i.e., we assumed that the Mutual Aid was proportional to the number of contributors). 
Furthermore, we considered only pure strategies. Players could either make a full contribution 
or none, and either punish all exploiters or none. This need not correspond to real-life 
situations, but rather aims at eliciting clear responses from the candidates facing choices 
between pro-social punishment mechanisms. Admittedly, these experimental strictures limit 
the generalizability of the results.  
 
4. Results: social learning of social control 
In the actual experiment, we observed strong changes in behavior in most of the 18 
groups, especially during the initial phase. 12 of the groups eventually settled down, in the 
sense that the same game was chosen by the majority for each of the last 10 rounds. Six of 
these groups settled down for pool punishment. All six belonged to the second-order 
treatment. In three groups playing the second-order treatment, and three groups playing the 
first-order treatment, players settled for peer punishment. The null hypothesis that pool 
punishment is equally likely in both treatments can be rejected with a significance of p<0.05 
(n1=9, n2=9, two-sided binomial sample test). Based on the theoretical model, we had indeed 
expected pool punishment to emerge in the second-order treatment only. 
The average frequency of pool punishment increased during the first rounds, in the 
second-order treatment, and overtook the frequency of peer punishment. In fact, the initial 
frequencies of (NoPun), (Peer), (Pool) and (No), in the first-order treatment, corresponded 
closely to the initial frequencies in the second-order treatment, but then the frequencies 
evolved very differently (see Figure 1). Frequencies of peer punishers decreased in both 
treatments, but only slowly. Frequencies of pool punishment decreased in the first-order 
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treatment, but increased in the second-order treatment. (See Online Resources for the 
regression equations) 
More precisely, in the first round of the second-order treatment, 55 per cent of players 
choose the peer punishment game and 36 per cent the pool punishment game. The initial 
frequencies in the first-order version were 56 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively. However, 
in the first-order treatment, both frequencies declined to reach 48 per cent and 19 per cent, 
respectively, by round 50. By contrast, the evolution in the second-order treatment reversed 
frequencies, so that after 50 rounds, 63 per cent of players opted for the pool punishment 
game but only 33 per cent for the peer punishment game (Figure 1b). This reversal took place 
in the first 20 rounds. The regression equation is y=0.326+0.0146x (where y represents the 
frequency of pool-punishment and x the round), with coefficient of determination R
2
=0.9167 
(which measures how well the regression line represents the data) and P-value<0.0001. 
Obviously, players approached both first- and second-order treatments with similar 
expectations, but then underwent a very different learning experience.  
If we average over all 50 rounds, we find a significant preference for peer punishment in 
the first-order treatment, and a less significant preference for pool punishment in the second- 
order treatment (Figure 3a). The latter treatment leads to a very pronounced cooperative 
behavior. Indeed, the frequency of contributions was significantly higher in the second-order 
treatment than in the first-order treatment (88.2 per cent vs. 48.9 per cent, Mann-Whitney 
U-test, n1=9, n2=9, p=0.0373), and it hardly changed over the 50 rounds (Figure 2b). We can 
see (Figure 3c and Online Resource) that average payoff values differ by little, but that peer 
punishment clearly yields the highest payoff in the first-order treatment, whereas it shares 
front rank with pool punishment, in the second-order treatment. 
In the first-order treatment, peer punishment was preferred by a wide margin: game 
(Peer) was chosen in 55.6 per cent of all decisions, game (Pool) in 20.2 per cent, game 
(NoPun) in 11.7 per cent and non-participation (No) in 12.6 per cent (Figure 3a). A majority 
(62 per cent) of decisions in the peer punishment game (Peer) were to contribute to the 
Mutual Aid, but not to punish, only 12 percent were for punishment. (In both treatments, the 
average number of peer punishers in the peer games is decreasing with the number of 
defectors. See Table S4 in Online Resource). The payoff of these first-order defectors was 
higher than that of the punishers (4.636 MU vs. 4.1 MU, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1=9, n2=9, 
p=0.077). It is obvious that within any round, this has to hold, if some players defect; we see 
here that it also holds on average. The non-contributors in the peer punishment game earned 
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marginally more than the non-participants (3.61 MU vs 3.5 MU, the difference is not 
significant). All in all, 48.9 per cent of all decisions were in favor of contributing to the 
Mutual Aid, rather than defecting (35.6 per cent) or abstaining from the game (15.5 per cent). 
But the time evolution over 50 rounds tells a more pessimistic story (Figure 2a). Three-fourth 
of players cooperated in the first round but half of them gave up in later rounds. The 
regression equation is y=0.669-0.0065x (where y represents the frequency of cooperation and 
x the round), with coefficient of determination R
2
=0.8812 and P-value <0.0001. Moreover, in 
the first-order pool punishment games, neither contributions to the Mutual Aid nor to the 
sanctioning took off. In particular, only a tiny fraction of the decisions (54 out of 1149) 
favored investing into the punishment pool.  
In the second-order treatment, the preferences for the games change drastically (the 
hypothesis that the preferences for the four games are the same can be rejected, using a 
Chi-square test, P-value<0.0001). The game (Pool), was chosen in 54.1 per cent of all 
decisions, and almost always (namely, in 3155 of 3174 cases) was combined with a decision 
to actually contribute to the punishment pool. The peer punishment game (Peer) was chosen 
in 41 per cent of the decisions. Interestingly, players who chose the peer punishment game 
rarely decided to actually punish (only 9 per cent did), and the average payoff for those who 
actually engaged in peer punishment, 3.78 MU, was significantly less than that of 
second-order free-riders (4.77 MU, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1=9, n2=9, p=0.0106). But this 
minority of peer-punishers sufficed to keep free-riding in the Mutual Aid game down to 16 
per cent. Few decisions (4.5 per cent) were in favor of the alternative (NoPun), i.e., joining a 
Mutual Aid game without punishment, and only 0.4 per cent were in (No). The average 
payoff for the peer punishment game (Peer) was insignificantly larger than for the 
pool-punishment game (Pool) (4.49 MU vs. 4.46 MU), but those who actually peer-punished 
had a significantly lower payoff than those who actually contributed to the punishment pool 
(3.78 MU vs. 4.49 MU, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1=9, n2=9, p=0.004).  
The average payoff for those choosing a given game is almost the same for both first 
order and second order treatments, with one exception: the payoff for choosing pool 
punishment has substantially increased in the second-order treatment, because almost all 
players contributed to the Mutual Aid in the second-order treatment, but less than a third did 
so in the first-order version (Figure 3c). 
It remains to show that players, in this experiment, were essentially guided by social 
learning, defined here as preferential copying of the strategies with the highest payoff 
- 13 - 
observed among other players in the same group. There were 2850 decisions to switch to 
another strategy. Of these, 2012 decisions (70.6 percent) were in favor of a strategy having 
currently a strictly better payoff in the group. There were 7446 decisions not to switch, but to 
repeat the former move. In 76.1 percent of the cases, the payoff was optimal. Conversely, 
when the payoff was optimal, 85.7 percent (i.e., 5666 out of 6615) of the decisions were not 
to switch.  
The clearest form of social learning occurs when a player who switches adopts the 
strategy with currently highest payoff. This occurs indeed for 1700 of the 2850 switches. The 
frequency of players who adopt a strategy which is less than optimal decays exponentially in 
d, the difference between the current optimum and the current payoff of the strategy that the 
switching player will adopt in the next round. (Nonlinear regression 0.4058 0.2888d   , 
correlation coefficient R=0. 8439 and P-value<0.001, see Figure S3 in Online Resource). 
Needless to say, in the next round both the optimal payoff and the payoff of the newly 
adopted strategy may be different.   
If we define a player as social learner when at least 90 percent of that player’s decisions 
could be explained either as (a) switching to a strategy with currently higher payoff, or as (b) 
sticking with a strategy of currently highest payoff, then 78.6 percent of the players were 
social learners. We stress that the players had only 15 seconds between rounds, which hardly 
offered them time for strategic calculations. 
  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Coercion plays an essential role in overcoming social dilemmas. The corresponding line 
of reasoning goes back at least as far as Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ from 1651, and the practical 
implementation can be traced throughout history. The selfish motivations endangering 
collective actions have to be suppressed by positive and negative incentives (Olson 1965; 
Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Andreoni et al., 2003; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). In 
particular, the threat of punishment curbs the temptation to free-ride, i.e., to exploit the 
contributions of others without offering an adequate return. 
Institutions can be viewed as tools for providing incentives (Ostrom, 2005). It has been 
shown that even in small-scale societies far removed from ‘Leviathan’-like states, grass-root 
institutions can deal, often efficiently, with the tasks of monitoring joint efforts and 
sanctioning defectors (Ostrom, 1990; Boehm, 2000; Henrich, 2006; Baldassarri and 
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Grossman, 2011). We wanted to test how players could opt for such a rudimentary institution, 
modeled as pool-punishment.  
Our experiment is close in spirit and design to an experiment by Gürerk et al. 2006. In 
that experiment, players were given the choice between a Public Good game with and one 
without peer punishment. The majority started with a clear preference for the treatment 
without punishment, but switched after a few rounds to the peer-punishment treatment, 
apparently guided by payoff considerations. Essentially, we kept the three-staged structure 
(choice of treatment, decision to contribute, decision to punish), but added pool punishment 
and non-participation as additional choices. (In contrast to the paper by Gürerk et al. 2006, we 
did not allow for rewarding; a related endogenous choice between peer punishing and 
rewarding has been investigated by Sutter et al. (2010), who found that reward was often 
chosen.)  
The option of pool punishment adds an important element, as it essentially provides the 
opportunity for a tacit social contract establishing a sanctioning institution. To our knowledge, 
this is the first experiment demonstrating that such a social contract can emerge through social 
learning based on comparing the (frequency dependent) payoff values of diverse options. 
‘Social contract’ means that players can submit to a sanctioning authority, captured here as a 
‘punishment pool’. By contrast, peer punishment corresponds to self-justice, and belongs to 
an anarchic ‘state of nature’. Both philosophers and experimental game theorists have shown 
that peer punishment can lead to an escalation of conflicts, i.e., to a ‘war of all against all’. 
For example, John Locke wrote in §126 of his ‘Two Treatises of Government’ from 1689 that 
in the state of nature,’… resistance [by defaulters] many times makes the punishment 
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it’. In a similar vein, experiments 
such as those by Denant-Boemont, Masclet, Noussair (2007), Nikiforakis (2008) or 
Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) show that peer punishment can invite counter-punishment 
and lead to costly feuds. We have deliberately excluded the possibility of counter-punishment, 
which threatens self-justice; we also have excluded the possibility of a corrupt authority, 
which threatens sanctioning institutions. The different punishment regimes offered in our 
experiment were, in this sense, idealized, pro-social versions.  
The lesson for institution design is clear: pool punishment requires the sanctioning of 
second-order free-riders. The important role of second-order free-riding is well-known (Oliver 
1980), and our experiment confirms it. In the second-order treatment, pool punishment 
effectively prohibits this possibility, whereas in the first-order treatment, it does not. 
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Apparently, pool-punishers notice that they are exploited, in the first-order treatment, and 
react against this breach in equity (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006). Voting for the second-order 
treatment implies a higher commitment.  
We now discuss several aspects of the experimental design which may limit the 
generalizability of our results.  
We did allow for players to abstain from the game. Clearly, there exist joint enterprises 
or common resources from which one cannot abstain: the global climate is the best example. 
Such compulsory interactions do not belong to the class considered here, since we have 
allowed players to opt for non-participation. Nevertheless, it could well be that the main 
‘efficiency vs. stability’ result still holds for compulsory games. It was for two reasons that 
we decided to consider only voluntary interactions in our experiment: first, because the 
theoretical results guiding our predictions were derived for this class of games only, and 
second because, in the course of the experiment, we sometimes (but rarely) encounter a player 
who is the only individual choosing a given Mutual Aid game of type (NoPun), (Peer) or 
(Pool). In this case, it is practical to assign them option (No), namely ‘non-participation’. 
This, incidentally, hardly affects the statistics. 
The fact that we chose a Mutual Aid game, rather than the Public Good game, should not 
overly restrict the range of applications. We did so because the number of players was 
variable, and that the Public Good game is stops being a social dilemma if the number of 
players is smaller than the multiplication factor r. In contrast, a Mutual Aid game always is a 
social dilemma: this makes the issue of altruism vs. free-riding more clear-cut. As a 
real-world example of a Mutual Aid game, we refer to the ‘sick clubs’ or ‘friendly societies’ 
run by working men in nineteenth-century England (see Sugden, 1986). If one of the members 
fell ill, the others could contribute to his aid. Such joint enterprises were informal fore-runners 
of state insurance schemes. If we assume that in a given period, everyone is equally likely to 
fall ill, and that the others could decide between contributing a fixed amount or not, we obtain 
exactly the structure of a Mutual Aid game.      
In our experimental design, we did not allow for punishment of non-punishers in the peer 
punishment game. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, theoretical models predict that it 
has no effect on the outcome (Sigmund et al, 2010). On the other hand, economic experiments 
have confirmed this in similar situations (Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Kiyonari and Barclay 
2008; Traulsen et al. 2012). We do not expect second-order peer punishment to affect the 
outcome. 
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We have reduced all individual decisions to choices between two, three or four 
alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate scenarios where players have a larger range 
of strategies, for instance by allowing them to choose between ten levels of contribution to the 
Mutual Aid, or different degrees of punishment. Similarly, we have proposed only one, 
extremely rudimentary form of institution. It is easy to think of better designs, for instance by 
allowing part, at least, of the unused funds to return to the players who have contributed to the 
punishment pool. We refrained from doing this, because we did not want to make it too easy 
for institutional punishment to emerge. The fact that as many groups ended up with peer- as 
with pool-punishment suggests that we succeeded in this ‘calibration’. Moreover, our 
experiment is already complex enough, and we feared to make it cognitively too demanding 
by adding more choices. As it was, the practice rounds needed to familiarize the players with 
their options took almost one hour (as long as the subsequent experiment).   
Our main objective was to compare two different versions of pool punishment (rather 
than pool with peer). We note that there exist at least three experiments (independently 
conceived and in part not yet published) comparing pool with peer punishment, or ‘informal’ 
with ‘formal’ sanctions (Kamei et al. 2011; Markussen et al. 2011; Traulsen et al. 2012). 
Kamei et al. 2011 and Markussen et al. 2011 adopt a continuous version of first-order pool 
punishment, and Traulsen et al. 2012 consider both first- and second-order pool punishment 
(same as our experiment). In Markussen et al. 2011, fixed groups of five players play for 24 
rounds, and can vote, at specific instants, between two different regimes (corresponding, in 
our setup, to decisions between (NoPun) and (Peer), (Peer) and (Pool), or (NoPun) and 
(PoolC)). In Kamei et al. 2011, the choice is between (Peer) and (Pool) with various 
parameters for the sanctions. Informal sanctioning does remarkably well, both from the 
viewpoint of frequency and payoff. (The experiment by Ertan et al. 2009 and the theoretical 
model by Boyd et al. 2010 confirm that peer punishment works well when players have an 
opportunity for coordinating.) In contrast, formal sanctions (which did not include 
second-order punishment) fared poorly.    
The experiment by Traulsen, Röhl and Milinski 2012 investigates three treatments. In 
(a), players are offered the possibility of peer punishment, first 10 rounds without, then 15 
rounds with second-order punishment. In (b), players are offered the possibility of pool 
punishment, again first without, then with second-order punishment. In (c), players could use 
both types of punishment in each round, by investing into a punishment pool before the public 
good interaction, and exerting peer punishment after the public good interaction. Again, this 
was first played without, and then with second-order punishment. In (a), switching from first- 
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to second-order punishment had very little effect; in (b) and (c), the switch strongly boosted 
pool punishment. In our experiment, players were not allowed to use both types of 
punishment simultaneously. They had to decide between one or the other (or none), thereby 
going separate ways, and building communities with different rules. 
In all these experiments (including ours) peer punishment did reasonably well. This may 
in part be due to the higher efficiency in the optimal situation when all contribute to the 
Mutual Aid, or the Public Good. It may also be due to the fact that possibilities for retaliation 
and feuding were excluded in the experimental designs. 
Since we wanted to favor conditions for social learning, we provided the players with 
information on the frequencies and payoffs obtained by the various strategies in their group 
(See Online Resource). However, we refrained from giving them opportunities to build up 
individual profiles, for instance reputations, or significant differences in resources. Needless 
to say, this does not imply that reputations or differences in resource holding power are 
irrelevant for the evolution of institutions. Similarly, we did not consider other-regarding 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or contests between groups, although such struggles 
played doubtlessly an important role in human evolution (Choi and Bowles 2007).   
What are the roots of sanctioning institutions? Our players were given the choice 
between one type of peer and one type of pool punishment. Needless to say, such an approach 
cannot tell how such opportunities for sanctioning emerge. Cooperation has frequently arisen 
through biological evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995), often via subtle 
mechanisms suppressing competition (Frank 1995), and there exist many examples of animals 
punishing each other (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). In particular, parents repress 
competition between their offspring, in many species, and it may be that this eventually led, in 
human populations, to institutionalized sanctioning. Offspring would simply have to remain 
with their parents (a costly option which provides some safety) rather than leave and defend 
their interests single-handedly. This fits with Jean Jacques Rousseau’s claim, in ‘Du Contrat 
Social’ from 1762, that ‘the family is the first model of a political society: its head is the 
image of the father’ (Book 1, Chapter 2). However, such a scenario was not addressed in our 
experiment. We presumed that the interactions are symmetric, and that all participants have 
equal resources. This better fits with Boehm 2000, who proposed another origin for 
sanctioning institutions. Its first instances, accordingly, were coalitions directed against 
alpha-males in the group, and the first social contract aimed at suppressing bullying behavior, 
in order to guarantee an egalitarian distribution of big-game meat.    
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It seems that institutions, once they have arisen, apply themselves to curb the vengeful 
and aggressive instincts fuelling peer-punishment. It would be interesting to explore this, both 
by modeling and by experiment. In our experimental setup, we have not allowed 
pool-punishers to sanction peer-punishers, or punished players to retaliate (Cinyabuguma et 
al. 2006; Nikiforakis 2008). We also excluded communication and deliberation, although 
theoretical models, field observations and experiments alike have stressed the importance of 
communication in sanctioning exploiters (Walker et al. 2000; Bochet et al. 2006; Ertan et al. 
2009). If individuals can look for allies, or deliberate with their peers, stable systems of 
incentives can arise (Casari and Luini 2009; Ertan et al. 2009; Boyd et al. 2010). We aimed 
for a minimalistic scenario based on social learning, and showed that it can lead to the 
emergence of a rudimentary type of institutionalized coercion helping to overcome 
individuals’ selfish preferences.  
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Figure 1 
Time-evolution of the frequencies of players voting for the games (NoPun), (Peer), (Pool) or (No) in (a) the 
first-order treatment and (b) the second order treatment. In each case the numbers are obtained by summing over 
the nine corresponding groups. (For the frequencies in each group, we refer to Figure S2 of the Supplementary 
Online Resource). 
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Figure 2 
Time-evolution of the frequencies of cooperation (C, blue), defection (D, red) and non-participation (No, yellow) 
over 50 rounds in the first- and the second-order treatments, summed over the nine corresponding groups. (2a) In 
the first-order treatment, defection was chosen by about one-third of the players in each round. The number of 
contributions declined in favor of non-participation. (2b) In the second-order treatment, almost all the players 
chose to contribute. This cooperative regime was stably sustained. 
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Figure 3 
(3a) Frequencies of the decisions in favor of the different games, over 50 rounds, for the first- and the 
second-order treatments. In the first-order treatment, peer punishment is favored. In the second-order treatment, 
pool punishment is more frequent, but error bars overlap. (3b) Frequencies of the decisions to contribute to the 
Mutual Aid game, to defect (i.e., not to contribute) and to opt for non-participation, averaged over 50 rounds. 
Contribution is strongly promoted in the second-order treatment. (3c) Payoffs obtained for the different games 
(NoPun), (Peer), (Pool), averaged over fifty rounds, do not greatly differ. Nevertheless, in the first-order 
treatment, peer punishment games, and in the second-order treatment, both peer and pool punishment games 
provided the highest average payoff. Error bars indicate standard errors of the group means.  
 
 
